University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1995

Introduction Feature: Right after Communism: Introduction
Cass R. Sunstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Introduction Feature: Right after Communism: Introduction," 4 East European
Constitutional Review 61 (1995).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

WINTER

1995

Ins5iutonal and psychological perspectives on postcommunist rights

FEATURE:
Rights After Communism
Introduction
Cass R. Sunstein
Contrary to the suggestion in much Western political thought, rights do not fall from the sky. They
depend for their existence on public institutions.
They cost money, perhaps a great deal of money.
(This is true not only for social and economic
rights but for so-called negative rights as well; government cannot protect property and life itself
without resources.) Rights will not exist without a
rights-bearing culture, that is, a culture in which
ordinary people are at least sometimes willing to
take serious personal risks by challenging powerful people by insisting that rights are at stake. The
protection of rights will require government to act
in both public and private spheres, sometimes
within the family itself (as, for example, in the prevention of domestic violence).
These are the principal lessons that emerge from
the following essays on rights after Communism.
Ewa Letowska shows that the activity of the
ombudsman-a potentially crucial actor in Eastern
Europe-has been necessary to ensure that rights on
paper actually mean something in the real world.
Ombudsman action was required in Poland to establish that a woman could not be refused employment
because the job of engine driver was "too hard for
her"; ombudsman action was also necessary to upset

a conviction of a professor who had criticized a particular decision of the minister of education as reminiscent of "socialist pathology." (The prosecution
itself certainly deserved that appellation even if the
decision at issue did not.) Kim Lane Scheppele
shows that paper guarantees of sex equality can
coexist with extensive sex discrimination and
inequality. Consider the fact that in Poland, 90 occupations are closed to women by law, and that no laws
in Eastern Europe ban sexual harassment. Russia has
created extensive constitutional protections for the
accused and committed those protections to paper;
but the Supreme Court of Russia has held that the
privilege against self-incrimination is sufficiently
protected if the defendant is told that he has a right
to give a statement of confession (on the astonishing
theory that this statement implicitly conveys the
right not to give such a statement).
Inga Mikhailovskaia's important empirical
study shows, among many other things, that the
right to religious liberty and the right to receive
and distribute information are ranked as "important" or "very important" by less than half of
respondents, whereas the right to social security is
so ranked by nearly 96 percent. This finding has
many possible implications. Certainly it is reason-
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able to say that the finding suggests what will happen in the future: The rights people actually have
will likely have some connection with the rights
that they want. But we might react as well by
insisting that the responses are disturbing, since
the category of rights, and especially of constitutional rights, need not be coextensive with the category of important human interests. Rights are,
among other things, pragmatic instruments whose
acknowledgment in law is designed to accomplish concrete
social tasks. To say that there ought not to be a legal
right to (for example) environmental quality is not
to disparage environmental protection; so too with
the right to fair compensation for one's labor; so
too with the right to equal pay for equal work.
The acknowledgment of these things as rights
may not accomplish anything in the world; rights
of this sort may not realistically be subject to protection through courts or through other public
channels. We do not disparage such interests if we
refuse to recognize them as rights, or if we reserve
the category of legal rights to human interests
whose protection as rights will actually do some
good for human beings.
There is a final point. One of Mikhailovskaia's
questions opposes individual rights to the interests
of the state, and asks whether the former can be

abridged because of the latter. But many rights actually serve collective interests, by making it possible
to have and maintain a certain kind of society with
a certain sort of culture. Consider here the legal
philosopher Joseph Raz's striking suggestion: "If I
were to choose between living in a society which
enjoys freedom of expression, but not having the
right myself, or enjoying the right in a society
which does not have it, I would have no hesitation
in judging that my own personal interest is better
served by the first option." Rights and Individual
Well-Being, in Ethics in the Public Domain 39
(1994). Part of the reason for a system of free speech
is not to protect the individual speaker, but to allow
processes of public deliberation and discussion that
serve public goals by, for example, constraining governmental power and makingjust and effective outcomes more likely.
This point--often ignored in the West as well as
the East-suggests that many rights deserve to exist
because of their consequences for society in general.
A point of this kind permeates the essays that follow. It helps account for the need for real-world
institutions safeguarding constitutional guarantees,
and for the more than occasional difficulty of
obtaining such institutions in view of the complex
psychology of rights.
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